Dubai und deutsche Banken

Endlich gibt es ein paar Details, welche deutsche Banken und zu wieviel im Dubai-SankastenPonzi investiert sind. Soviel vorab, keine Überraschungen, DB, KFW, West LB:

(HT Zero Hedge)

Die nächste Frage ist, ist Griechenland das Dubai Europas? In Abu Dhabi leckt man sich jetzt schon die Finger, denn Dubai class assets sind für einen Appel und Ei zu bekommen. Die Daumenschrauben sind schon bereitgelegt.

TUI says Thank You to Deutsche Bank

Hat tip Dealbreaker

From: TUI Investor Relations

Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2009 12:06 PM

Subject: TUI: Open letter to our Shareholders

Importance: High

Dear Shareholder,

It will probably have not passed your notice that on Tuesday, 16th June the TUI share price dropped by more than 18% from 6.13 Euro to around 5.02 Euro. At almost 8 million shares, the number of shares traded on this day was well above the average. This development can be attributed to an analyst report on TUI by Deutsche Bank. On this day they published a research update setting a price target for the TUI share of 1.90 Euro and subsequently a sell recommendation.

Following a review of this valuation by TUI, it became apparent that the update contained technical mistakes in the sum of the parts valuation. This concerned in particular the valuation of the shareholder loan to TUI Travel and the pensions, the effects of which totalled approx. 4 Euros per share. TUI discussed this with the analyst at Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank corrected the technical errors in their valuation and released a corrected version to the original report on Wednesday afternoon. The revised target price is now 4.40 Euro (2.50 Euro higher than before). The sell recommendation remains unchanged. On analysis, whilst the bank has corrected the mistakes, they have now also adjusted some of their original assumptions to the detriment of the TUI valuation. For example the report now includes a conglomerate discount of 20%. On the basis of the assumptions published on Tuesday and only taking into account the correction of the mistakes, the calculated TUI valuation would be around 6 Euros per share. This was virtually the share price level before the report was published and would probably not have justified a sell recommendation.

Best regards,

Berlin, Hanover, June 2009

TUI AG

The Executive Board

In case you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Speaking of German banks: Deutsche Bank

is putting out some stops and going pretty much pedal to the metal in program trading.

(H/T Goldman Sachs 666)

Kölnische Rück/Gen Re und Side Letters

Risiken über Rückversicherungen abzusichern ist opportun und sinnvoll und man hat ausserdem die Bücher frei davon. Nun gab es Fälle, wo diese scheinbare Absicherung über sog. Side Letters praktisch zurückgenommen wurde. MaW, es besteht keine Absicherung, ABER bilanzmässig sieht alles bestens aus.

AIG, welche Überraschung, war so eine Firma und wurde auch verurteilt deswegen.

The SEC fined them $10mil in 2003 for using this craftiness to help a communications company called Brightpoint inflate its earnings, and AIG-FP was investigated in 2004 for helping PNC Bank shift bad assets into a special-purpose entity (this ended in a deferred-prosecution agreement). Anyway, around ‘04 they decided the side letter jig was up… and AIG entered the CDS markets.

Und nun ist ein ganz brisanter Artikel raus:

AIG: Before Credit Default Swaps, There Was Reinsurance

In fact, our investigation suggests that by the time AIG had entered the CDS fray in a serious way more than five years ago, the firm was already doomed. No longer able to prop up its earnings using reinsurance because of growing scrutiny from state insurance regulators and federal law enforcement agencies, AIG’s foray into CDS was really the grand finale. AIG was a Ponzi scheme plain and simple, yet the Obama Administration still thinks of AIG as a real company that simply took excessive risks. No, to us what the fraud Bernard Madoff is to individual investors, AIG is to the global financial community.

Der Artikel behandelt weiter, dass diese CDS Versicherungen geschrieben wurden mit dem EXPLIZITEN AUSSCHLUSS JEGLICHER VERSICHERUNG. Dies eben in einem Side Letter! Und sie eröffneten eine sichere Einnahmequelle über Fees von üblicherweise 6% pro Jahr. Wohlgemerkt,mit der Gewissheit, KEINE Gegenleistung erbringen zu müssen.

Warum ist das für Deutschland von Relevanz? Nun, dazu weiter unten. Zunächst …

The significance of this for the US bailout of AIG is profound. If our surmise is correct, the position of Feb Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner that the AIG credit default contracts are „valid legal contracts“ is ridiculous and reveals a level of ignorance by the Fed and Treasury about the true goings on inside AIG and the reinsurance industry that is truly staggering.

Ein Blick auf dieses Dokument zeigt, das neben jeder Menge US Banken die Deutsche Bank angeführt ist. Und dies erklärt auch …

Now you know why the Fed and EU officials are so terrified about an AIG liquidation, because it will result in heavy losses to or even the insolvency of banks and other corporations around the globe. 

Notice that while German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been posturing and throwing barbs at President Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been conciliatory toward the US.

Voller Artikel, der ein absolutes Must Read ist … und in der Zwischenzeit viel Spass bei der Bärenrallye an der Börse.

und wie hoch ist der Müll bei Deutsche Bank?

ComBank/DreBank 6,6 Mrd Verlust in 08. Knapp 4o Mrd Müllpapiere.

Was wird Deutsche Bank bald berichten müssen?

AIG und Verbindlichkeiten mit europäische Banken

Hat tip ALEA

Unten die Zahlungen, die Banken erhielten.

Irgendwelche Klagen, Anschie, Peer??

HRE: Bad Bank

Hervorragender Artikel in der Berliner Morgenpost über die Müllkippe HRE (Hyper Rotten Enterprise). Do. ist Press Conf der DB. Josef wird hier nicht über seine Beteiligungen an der HRE auspacken. Dies wird in den Wochen später heraussickern. Abzuwarten auch noch was Mr. Flowers hervorzaubert.

Do. 5. Feb. Sauerkraut und Bratwurst verbannt in FRA

Donnerstag, 5. Feb. 2009, DEUTSCHE BANK Jahrespressekonferenz

Josef Ackermann wird berichten.

In Bereitschaft werden 20 Ambulanzwagen stehen. Sauerkratut und Bratwürstchen sind im Umkreis von 500 Metern verboten.

Daten der DB:

- Börsenwert 12 Mlrd.

- Eigenkapital 34 Mlrd.

Eigentlich ein schreiender Kauf. Wenn nicht noch etliche Leichen sich unter den offiziell 92 Mlrd. (!!) Risikopositionen befinden und das Massengeschäft kann bei der Bankenschwemme in D-Land keine Lösung sein.

Das Wettlokal Deutsche Bank

BW Auszug: „As recently as the second half of 2008, a few hundred so-called proprietary traders were allowed to speculate, with a sum numbering in the double-digit billions, on the future development of stock prices, credit derivatives and pork bellies. This activity constituted up to 20 percent of all securities transactions at Deutsche Bank. In good years, proprietary trading was responsible for about one third of total profits.“

DB verkündet Geschäftsergebnis 08 im Feb. Sicherheitsgurte anlegen, Airbags prüfen. Alle Leichen im Schrank werden nicht auf den Tisch gelegt werden.

Eh, Finanzhilfe vom Staat??? Iiiwo, “We are a long way from that,“ Ackermann said.

Deutsche Bank wird mit absoluter Sicherheit Staatshilfe gebrauchen!

Cazenove hat gerade diesen Report herausgebracht und dem zufolge ist noch längst nicht alles kosher für DB. UND abzuwarten bleiben die Auswirkungen des extrem hohen Leverage auch bei der Comm. Bank und Dre. Bank.

It depicts the change in asset risks on banks’ balance sheets. As can be seen from the dark blue bars, all of the banks can make the claim that they are “deleveraging” (reducing risky assets) when they report their results.

The paler blue bars represent market risk-weighted assets: those really at the centre of the current crisis so far. CDOs, CLOs, CDS positions, prop positions and so on. What is striking, of course, is the dramatic growth in such market risk-weighted assets through Q3 08 at Deutsche, Commerzbank and Dresdner.  Deutsche has, of course, just reported a disastrous loss from its prop-desks and wealth management division. And CBK and DRN required a huge amount of fresh capital last week. (Hervorhebung von mir)

Die gelben Säulen zeigen die Risikoreduktion, was sich gut ausnimmt. ABER: Remarkably, these reductions were achieved in spite of net growth in customer loans, up to 15% growth in the case of DBK.

That last sentence we’ve highlighted is the important one. The risk weightings on credit assets have been decreasing even though the amount of credit assets has beenincreasing.

In other words, banks’ risk-weighted assets have yet to be impacted by a corporate downturn. Indeed, quite the opposite. So far, banks’ balance sheets continue tobenefit from the relatively benign corporate reporting through most of 2008.

Can this continue? Almost certainly not. As corporates begin to suffer (which we have only really begun to see since Oct/Nov) and experience downgrades and defaults, banks’ corporate asset risk-weightings will increase. In some circumstances, hugely. Caz’s analysis sees core Tier 1 ratios falling by 60bps at UBS, 110bps at CS and 180bps for DB based on a 2001 default rate.

If the default rate moves higher, the situation will be far more grave.

(Alphaville)